Aviation: manufacturer’s duty to warn of inadequacies in parts supplied

United KingdomScotland

A recent Privy Council decision is a reminder to manufacturers of aviation equipment that serious thought should go into whether modifications to their equipment warrant warning their airline customers of such changes.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also set out the circumstances in which an appellate court can overturn a first instance decision, stating that the appellate court should intervene only if it is satisfied that the judge was "plainly wrong", which would only occur in the rarest of circumstances.

Background

The appellant airline owned a Dash-8 aircraft which had been fitted with landing gear manufactured and supplied by the respondent. On April 2007, on landing, part of the landing gear collapsed, causing irreparable damage to the aircraft. The carrier brought a claim against the respondent manufacturer for the loss of the aircraft and the subsequent costs in investigations.

The carrier claimed that the damage was caused by a fault with part of the landing gear manufactured and supplied by the respondent. The carrier’s case was that the landing gear had not been effective for the stipulated number of cycles and that the respondent had breached their duty to the airline to provide warnings that the landing gear was inadequate, particularly after having modified the landing gear themselves.

The manufacturer defended the claim on the basis (1) that the landing gear was not inadequate but had been poorly maintained by the carrier, and (2) that their own modification of part of the landing gear was not evidence of the original being inadequate, and therefore it had not been necessary to provide any warning.

First instance decision

At first instance, the Chief Justice found for the airline that the original landing gear was inadequate and that the respondent manufacturer should have warned the carrier accordingly. The Chief Justice held that the accident would not have happened had warnings been given, and that the manufacturer’s own modification of the landing gear was evidence of the original being inadequate for purpose.

Court of Appeal

The manufacturer appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Bahamas held that it had jurisdiction to reassess the evidence from scratch.

In their re-investigation of all of the evidence, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Chief Justice on the following grounds:

  1. The modification of the landing gear had not been evidence of the equipment being inadequate – improving equipment does not mean that the original equipment was defective.
  2. The Chief Justice had been wrong to conclude that the manufacturer had failed to warn the carrier of the dangers when it had not even been proved that the landing gear was faulty or was the operative cause of the loss.
  3. The representation that the landing gear would be effective for a certain number of cycles should have been interpreted as a guide, not as a representation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Chief Justice fell into error, and that the manufacturer was not negligent in the manufacturing and supplying of the landing gear.

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

The Privy Council took issue with the findings of the Court of Appeal. The judgment specifically made reference to the following:

  1. The modification of the landing gear was evidence, which the Chief Justice had been entitled to accept, of there being a problem with the original equipment.
  2. The Chief Justice had been entitled to find that the manufacturer had a duty to, and had failed to warn the carrier of the dangers.
  3. The representation that the landing gear would be effective for a stated number of cycles could not have been intended as a guide when the representation was so critical to the safe functioning of an aircraft.

The Court of Appeal should not have departed from the Chief Justice’s decision in any event. The Privy Council recited material case law that sets out that an appellate court should only depart from a first instance decision when that decision is “plainly wrong” which would be in only “the rarest of circumstances”. This case was not such a scenario; the Chief Justice had used evidence to support his findings of fact and so the Court of Appeal were not entitled to examine the evidence de novo simply because they disagreed with those findings.
The Privy Council set aside the Court of Appeal decision and restored the order of the Chief Justice.

Comment

The findings of the Privy Council should act as a reminder to manufacturers of aviation equipment that serious thought should go into whether modifications to their equipment warrants warning their airline customers of these changes. Where such equipment is crucial to health and safety, a strict approach may be taken in the future, in the light of this judgment.

The Privy Council also reiterated the precedents set by previous cases that the Court of Appeal should only reassess the merits of a case in the rarest of circumstances. The Court of Appeal should not have conducted its own analysis when the first instance judge had acted reasonably in making his findings at the first instance trial. This case therefore emphasises the difficulty an appellant will face in their appeal process if there is no error of fact or law.

Further reading:

Bahamasair Holdings Ltd v Messier Dowty Inc [2018] UKPC 25.